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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
.i.J 
SKYLINE LEASING, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
vs. 
DATACAP, a division of 
International Computer Systems, 
Inc., a Utah Corporation; and 
INTERNATIONAL COMPUTER SYSTEMS, 
INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants, " 
EDWARD D. BARNES, 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SKYLINE LEASING, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
vs. 
DATACAP, a division of 
International Computer Systems, 
Inc., a Utah Corporation; and 
INTERNATIONAL COMPUTER SYSTEMS, 
INC., a Utah Corporation, 
EDWARD D. BARNES, 
Defendants, 
Defendant-
Appellant . 
No. 13971 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Plaintiff agrees with Defendant's recitation of Nature 
of the Case, Disposition in Lower Court, Relief Sought on Appeal 
and Statement of Facts. 
ARGUMENT 
EDWARD D. BARNES SIGNED PLAINTIFF'S MASTER LEASE 
AGREEMENT FOR HIMSELF AND IS PERSONALLY LIABLE AS SIGNATOR OR 
GUARANTOR ON THE LEASE. 
Without attempting to argue whether or not the appli-
cation of 70-A-3-403(2)(b) to the case was a proper application Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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of law, the Trial Court did not rely entirely upon that section, 
but also interpreted the entire agreement and stated: 
"The Court is of the opinion that the evidence is 
sufficient to indicate that the defendant Barnes 
and the plaintiff each intended that his signature 
to the Lease Agreement bind him personally. Only 
one authorized signature would have been enough to 
bind the corporation, and a reasonable interpretation 
of there being more than one signature is that it was 
intended to bind the signator personally." 
With virtually no exceptions, the Defendant attacks 
the decision of the lower court alleging erroneous application 
of law when in fact, the defendant really disputes the findings 
of the lower court. Since no record of proceedings is attached, 
the status of the law is clear that the Appeal Court may not 
review the evidence or assume any facts not shown by the record. 
Walker Brothers v. Skliris, 98 P. 114, 34 Utah 353, 
stated: 
"The Supreme Court is bound by the record, as the 
same is certified . . . The Supreme Court will 
not leave the record . . . " 
Also, Perry Irrigation Company v. Thomas, 278 P. 535, 
74 Utah 193: 
"Questions or matters not presented in the record 
cannot or will not be considered by the appellate 
court.M 
Also, Warner v. United States Mutual Accident Associa-
tion, 32 P. 696, 8 Utah 431: 
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"On appeal from judgment, where the evidence is 
not in the record, the Supreme Court will only 
consider matters appearing in the judgment roll," 
Also, Henroid v. East Tintic Development Company, 173 
P. 134. 52 Utah. 245: 
MIn the absence of a bill of exceptions containing 
the evidence, assignment of error that the Court's 
findings are not supported by the evidence, cannot 
be reviewed, the presumption being that the findings 
are in strick conformity with the evidence." 
Also, Klein v. Matthews, 106 P.2d 773 99 U 398: 
"On Appeal from judgment for the plaintiff in 
ejectment, assignment of error in permitting Plain-
tiff's counsel to act in case . . . raises question 
of evidence which the Supreme Court cannot consider 
in absence of a bill of exceptions containing evidence.' 
The problem with the defendant's contentions is that 
the lower court found otherwise, and in the absence of the 
record the decision of the Trial Court as to facts must stand. 
"The record does not show that the Trial Court was 
requested to invoke the parole evidence rule. This 
Court has consistently held that any point not be-
fore the Trial Court cannot be brought up for the 
first time before the Supreme Court." 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is well-settled 
law in the State of Utah and elsewhere that the parole evidence 
may be used where the instrument does not clearly set forth an 
essential fact or where the instrument is ambiguous. 
30 AM JUR 2nd Evidence Sec 1052: 
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"The general rule is that the true relation of 
parties . . . of a written contract . . . where 
the contract does not expressly show the relation-
ship, may be shown by parole evidence." 
Also 17 AM JUR 2nd Contracts Sec 295: 
"Also in most of the cases involving . . . surety 
or guaranty . . . the person who signed, though 
not named in the body of the contract, was held 
liable on the contract as a party thereto." 
Milford State Bank v. Westfield Canal and Irrigation 
Company, 162 P.2d, 101, 108 Utah 528: 
"Where contract was ambiguous, Court properly per-
mitted parties to testify. . ." 
A l s o
'
 E
- A. Strout, Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. 
Broderick, 522 P.2d 144 (Supreme Court of Utah) Utah Reports, 
(Not Printed): 
"Parole Evidence may be received to clarify ambiguous 
language in a contract . . . " 
The Court found the instrument ambiguous and accepted 
parole evidence, not to vary the terms, but to show whom of the 
signators were liable and to what extent. The Court found: 
" . . . that the evidence is sufficient to indicate 
that defendant Barnes and the Plaintiff each intended 
that his signature to the Lease Agreement, bind him 
personally . . . " 
Under Item C of his First Point, the defendant claims 
a legal presumption, and that the plaintiff failed to overcome 
the presumption by evidence. 
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If any legal presumption existed that Edward D. 
Barnes signed the lease as agent for International Computer 
System, it was overcome in the view of the Court. 
The problem with the defendant's allegations in his 
paragraph C is that there is nothing in the record before this 
Court which would show whether or not there was a sufficiency 
of evidence to overcome any real or imagined presumption. The 
defendant refers only to the promissory note and the applica-
t ion. These were not all of the facts considered by the Court. 
Since the Defendant does not cite or quote the record, there is 
no way that this Court can review the sufficiency of evidence. 
It must be presumed that the Lower Court found the evidence 
sufficient to overcome the presumption. 
Plaintiff further takes issue with the citation of 
the manner of signature found on the Lease Agreement cited by 
defendant on page 9 of his Brief. The lease document itself 
shows International Computer Systems, Lessee, then the word 
"by". Following the word "by11 the signature of Paul D. Gamble 
appears in black ink. Then on separate lines and in separate 
color ink appears the signatures of Robert H. Lundquist; Edward 
D. Barnes and Bernard M. Tanner. The word "by" does not precede 
any signature except that of Paul D. Gamble, and the Court so 
found. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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The same format is found in the application for a 
lease agreement. Here the document is signed by Paul D. 
Gamble, President; then Paul D. Gamble signed a second time; 
Edward D. Barnes signed 4/26/68 and Robert H. Lundquist signed. 
It is significant that Edward D. Barnes signed or wrote follow-
ing his name 4/26/68 when the date of the document appears to 
be one of April, 1968. The master lease was also dated one of 
April, 1968. It is also significant that only Paul D. Gamble 
signed in black ink. 
The representation on Page 10 that Edward D. Barnes 
signed as follows: 
INTERNATIONAL COMPUTER SYSTEMS, LESSEE 
By Edward D. Barnes 
is not an accurate representation of the facts as can be seen 
in Exhibit P(l). 
The point is made again and again directly and by 
illusion in defendant's brief that defendant Barnes clearly 
signed the Lease Agreement only in the status of agent. This 
is just not consistent with the findings of the Court and is 
not even an issue before this Court. 
At the bottom of page 13, plaintiff alleges that Edward 
Barnes name is preceded by the word "by". This is not the fact 
as reference to Exhibit P(l) will show. 
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II. THE ADMISSION OF THE EVIDENCE UPON WHICH THE 
AMOUNT OF JUDGMENT WAS BASED WAS COMPLETELY PROPER. 
The Plaintiff does not deem it necessary to argue 
Point 2 since there is nothing before this Court to show the 
basis upon which the Court accepted or rejected any evidence 
in the case. 
The information and comment on the testimony is not 
before this Court and the record has not been produced for 
examination by the Court. The comment on the testimony taken 
from Myron K Rigby on page 17 of defendant's brief and further 
referenced on pages 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the brief refer-
ring to testimony, simply ignores the fact that the Court 
found otherwise, and the basis of the Court's decision is not 
before this Court in the absence of a produced transcript of 
testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant has made a laudable effort to make a 
case out of very limited evidentiary material consisting of 
Exhibit P(l) and Exhibit P(2). The basic problem with the 
defendant's appeal is that he contests facts found by the 
Court. It is submitted that such questions, in the absence of 
a record cannot be considered by this Appeal Court. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The Court found that the evidence was sufficient to 
indicate defendant Barnes and the Plaintiff each intended that 
his signature on the Lease Agreement bind him personally. 
The plaintiff respectfully prays that the judgment 
be confirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LORIN N. PACE 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
431 South Third East Suite B-l 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the fore-
going Brief of Respondent to Kay M. Lewis, JENSEN & LEWIS, 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant Edward D. Barnes, 320 South 
300 East, Suite 1, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, postage prepaid 
this day of August, 1975. 
LORIN N. PACE 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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